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TEN YEARS AFTER: EVOLVING MENTAL




As today's symposium marks my tenth anniversary on the mental
health law conference circuit, I thought I might take advantage of
the coincidence by trying to survey the major mental health law
developments over the past decade. I hope that this survey will
identify: (1) the major legal trends in mental disability law (and
where we can reasonably expect them to lead in the future);' (2)
other social, economic, and political extra-legal developments that
have influenced and will likely continue to influence these trends; 2
and (3) (to the extent that it can be done) the shifting ways the
organized mental disability professions (especially, but not limited
to, psychiatry) have influenced and responded to these developments. 3
I am also going to try to look at all of these developments through
one specific filter: that of the full-time mental health advocate, the
attorney whose sole job it is to provide high-quality, regularized,
specialized legal services to mentally handicapped persons.4
* Address to the Mental Health Legal Advocacy Symposium, "Current Issues
in Law and Psychiatry," New York, New York, May 30, 1985.
** Associate Professor of Law, and Director, Federal Litigation Clinic, New
York Law School, New York, New York; A.B., 1966, Rutgers University; J.D.,
1969, Columbia University School of Law; Special Counsel to the Commissioner,
Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton, New Jersey, 1982-1984; Director,
Division of Mental Health Advocacy, Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton,
New Jersey, 1974-1982; Acting Director, Advocacy for the Developmentally Disabled
Project Office, Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton, New Jersey, 1976-
1978; Deputy Public Defender, Mercer County Trial Region, Office of the Public
Defender, Trenton, New Jersey, 1971-1974 (attorney in charge of Mercer County
Office, 1973-1974).
1. See infra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
4. See Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals
in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (Summer 1982)
[hereinafter Perlin & Sadoff]; Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment
and Guardianship Process, in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS
497 (P.L.I. 1979); Van Ness & Perlin, Mental Health Advocacy-The New Jersey
Experience, in MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS'
RIGHTS 62 (1977).
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II. Mental Health Trends
A decade ago, the notion of "patients' rights" had just taken its
first quantum leap from the pages of the law reviews into the
courtrooms and the official case reports. On two fronts, in the areas
of involuntary civil commitment5 and the right to treatment, 6 certain
federal courts had shown a significant sensitivity to the issues involved
in the ravages of mental illness and the desolation of the conditions to
which the mentally ill were often consigned, and they evinced an intel-
lectual boldness in being willing to apply the due process clause (and
other constitutional provisions) to a variety of fact patterns never be-
fore subjected to the constitutional microscope. As a result, cases such
as Lessard v. Schmidt' and Wyatt v. Stickney8 established new sets
of legal guidelines and, perhaps more important, laid down a moral
imperative for other courts, litigators, legislators and mental health
professionals to consider very, very carefully.
To top it off, the Supreme Court ruled ten years ago in O'Connor
v. Donaldson9 that there was a "constitutional right to liberty"' 0
and that a "finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a [s]tate's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely
in simple custodial confinement."" As a business school dean would
probably have put it, the notion of mental patients' rights appeared-
as of 1975-to be "an idea in good currency."
What has happened, then, in the intervening decade? Was 1975,
in retrospect, a high water mark? Was it an historical aberration?
Or was it some sort of 1848, one of those critical revolutionary
years that irrevocably altered the landscape for all future time? The
answer, it seems to me, is all of the above. Let me try to sort out
some of the trends in an effort to see if I can overlay any kind
of doctrinal consistency in an attempt to bring some sort of order
to the field.
5. The "lodestone case" is Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976).
6. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), later op.,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), later op., 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), later proceeding, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
10. Id. at 573.
11. Id. at 575.
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A. Developments in Mental Disability Law
The past decade has been an incredibly fertile one for the courts
and for litigants in the whole area of "mental disability law." Over
the past decade, we have seen the following developments:
(1) the creation of a coherent (well, mostly) body of civil commit-
ment law in virtually every circuit and many state supreme courts.
The United States Supreme Court seems to be content to allow the
lower courts to serve as laboratories of experimentation"2 and I do
not think it will attempt to deal with the question of "what procedure
is due?" any more than it already has in cases such as Jackson v.
Indiana,'3 O'Connor v. Donaldson,'4 Addington v. Texas, 5 Parham
v. J.R.,' 6 and Vitek v. Jones;'7
(2) the proliferation of right to treatment cases and right to habi-
litation cases (mostly owing their spiritual development to Wyatt),
culminating in the United States Supreme Court's 1982 decision of
Youngberg v. Romeo,'" holding that at least some substantive treat-
ment rights are mandated;
(3) the crafting of the constitutional right to refuse treatment (usually
but not always focusing on the involuntary administration of psy-
chotropic medication to institutionalized patients), following the leads
of Rennie v. Klein' 9 and Rogers v. Okin,20 again culminating in a
Supreme Court decision in Mills,2' which, at the least, indicated that
the Court was comfortable with the general contours of the right;
12. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
13. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Court's holding in Jackson.
14. 422 U.S. 563 (1975); see supra notes 9-11, infra notes 76-78, and accom-
panying text.
15. 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
16. 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
17. 445 U.S. 480 (1980); see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
18. 457 U.S. 307 (1982); see infra notes 90, 93-94 and accompanying text.
19. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), modified, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S.
1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
20. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on state
certification sub nom. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390
Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
21. 457 U.S. 291 (1982); see infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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(4) the creative expansion of both substantive and procedural rights
into areas of "other" institutional rights22 (such as due process in
hospital discipline,23 payment for "therapeutic" hospital labor2" and the
right to adequate exercise25), and into "other" institutions (for ex-
ample, federal,26 and private 27);
(5) the (still mostly unsuccessful) attempt to create a right to
aftercare/right to deinstitutionalization. While the Supreme Court
has appeared exceedingly uncomfortable with this notion, 2 other
courts have begun (very vaguely) to draw the contours of such a
right, usually via reliance on certain recent federal statutes; 29 and
(6) the first legal awakening of interest in the whole notion of
economic rights, covering such disparate issues as the right of patients
to control their own assets,30 their right to be paid for work done
while hospitalized, 3 the interplay between a hospital's accreditation
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and hos-
pital funding,3 2 and the implications of antitrust law for third-party
payments to competing psychotherapists.33
This brief overview does not even touch on tort-law developments,3 4
the interplay, if any, between mental health law and the plight of
22. See generally Perlin, Other Rights of Residents in Institutions, in 2 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1009 (P.L.I. 1979) (describing specific
rights such as visitation, access to counsel, freedom from forced labor, use of mails,
telephones, clothing, voting, freedom from reprisals, of institutionalized mental pa-
tients). See also Perlin, Civil Rights of Hospitalized Mental Patients, in 4 LESSON
29: DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHIATRY 3 (1984) (same).
23. See Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 875-78 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
24. See Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 812-14 (D.D.C. 1973).
25. See Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1208-10 (7th Cir. 1983).
26. See Falter v. Veterans' Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980) (suit
against medical center operated by Veterans' Administration).
27. See Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(suit against both county and private hospitals).
28. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984);
see infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text for the Court's holding.
29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982).
30. See Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd,
558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
31. See Souder, 367 F. Supp. at 812-14.
32. See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1131 (1985).
33. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). See generally Perlin,
Recent Developments in Mental Health Law, 6 PSYCHIATRC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 539, 546-47 (1983) (discussing business law decisions by Supreme Court
that may ultimately affect mental health providers).
34. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (patient's psychotherapists breached duty to protect
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the homeless,35 or the implications of recent post-Hinckley insanity
defense developments.3 6 In short, I can think of no other new area
of the law that has seen such extended growth and refinement in
the past decade.
B. Legislative Change
These judicial developments have been paralleled by important
legislative changes both in the state capitals and in Congress. While
trends may be a bit murkier here, certain principles have been
established.
(1) In the wake of (and, in many cases, in direct response to) the
Wyatt case,3 7 virtually every state now has some kind of an operative
"Patients' Bill of Rights," 3 legislatively mandating those rights that
were at the heart of the Wyatt decree: the right to a humane physical
and psychological environment, to qualified staff personnel, and to
individualized treatment plans for each patient.39 In many states,
these bills of rights also provide at least minimal substantive and
procedural due process protections to patients wishing to refuse the
imposition of unwanted medical treatment. 4° Patients' rights advo-
cates are increasingly turning their attention to these statutes as
intended victim by failing to warn victim after patient confided to therapists his
intention to kill victim); Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982)
(state hospital negligent in administering major tranquilizers to mentally retarded
resident without first obtaining written, informed consent from patient or guardian).
35. See generally THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (1984).
36. See Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Leg-
islative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397 (1983) (discussing role
of insanity defense and results after it is pleaded); see also Perlin, Whose Plea Is
It Anyway? Insanity Defense Myths and Realities, 79 PHILADELPHIA MEDICINE 5
(1983) (same).
37. See, e.g., The Wyatt Standards: An Influential Force in State and Federal
Rules, 28 Hose. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 374 (1977) (many new state laws
providing for patients' rights "contain provisions similar to the standards for
adequate care and treatment of the mentally ill and retarded in . . . the Wyatt v.
Stickney court order of 1972") (emphasis in original).
38. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5331 (West 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206(a)-(k) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459
(West 1986); MICH. Com,. LAWS ANN. §§ 300.1700 to -. 1754 (West 1980); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2 (West 1981); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.29 (Anderson
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4423 (Purdon 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61
(West Supp. 1986).
39. See Wyatt, 334 F. Supp. at 1343.
40. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-24.2d(1) (West 1981).
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potential sources of relief; 41 for many reasons, I expect this reliance
on state statutory law to grow exponentially in the future.
(2) The picture in Washington is, as usual, more confusing. While
Congress has been at least mildly vigorous in protecting the rights
of the developmentally disabled42 and those physically and mentally
handicapped persons receiving vocational rehabilitation services, 43 its
track record in matters involving the mentally ill is, for lack of a
more descriptive word, somewhat schizophrenic. Inspired by the 1978
President's Commission on Mental Health Report, 44 Congress passed
the Mental Health Systems Act of 198041 in a comprehensive effort
to upgrade community-based mental health services on a national
level. 46 As part of that Act, it enacted-for the first time-a Patients'
Bill of Rights.47 While that Act was a drastically watered down
version of the suggestions embodied in the President's Commission
Report, 48 it still included two key sections: the first federal patients'
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Shapiro, 197 N.J. Super. 320, 484 A.2d 1282 (App.
Div), certification denied, 101 N.J. 325, 501 A.2d 912 (1984) (patient in psychiatric
hospital brought action under New Jersey's patients' "Bill of Rights" to receive
mail).
42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 6000
of title 42 of the United States Code describes the purpose of the sections:
It is the overall purpose of this chapter to assist States to (A) assure
that persons with developmental disabilities receive the care, treatment,
and other services necessary to enable them to achieve their maximum
potential through increased independence, productivity, and integration
into the community, and (B) establish and operate a system which
coordinates, monitors, plans, and evaluates services which ensures the
protection of the legal and human rights of persons with developmental
disabilities.
Id. § 6000 (Supp. III 1985).
43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The congressional
declaration of purpose is "to develop and implement, through research, training,
services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated
programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living." Id. § 701 (1982).
See infra note 107 for the text of § 794 of title 29 of the United States Code,
which prohibits discrimination under federal programs.
44. 1 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH (1978) [hereinafter REPORT].
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9401-9523 (1982).
46. See id. § 9401(l)-(9) (congressional statement of findings).
47. Id. § 9501.
48. Compare 1 REPORT, supra note 44, at 42-45 with 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1982)
(patient's bill of rights). The Report from the President's Commission recommended
that:
Each State review its mental health laws and revise them, if necessary,
to ensure that they provide for:
a) a right to treatment/right to habilitation and to protection from harm




bill of rights of any sort for mental health patients, 49 and an advocacy
provision that provided grants to select experimental pilot programs
to provide regularized mental health advocacy services to the mentally
disabled. 5°
A diversion is necessary here to provide a bit of background: one
of the President's Commission's major recommendations had been
to mandate a national system of such advocacy programs." This
recommendation reflected: (1) the paucity of such legal services then
generally available to the institutionalized mentally disabled;52 (2) the
shoddy track record of most lawyers who had provided such services
on a sporadic or occasional basis;" and (3) the recognition that,
without such programs, the promise of the right to counsel-a right
found by a host of federal courts and state supreme courts54-would
be little more than a hollow shell. The second prong of the federal
law I have just mentioned was specifically crafted to respond to
this set of circumstances.
b) a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting;
c) a right to refuse treatment, with careful attention to the circumstances
and procedures under which the right may be qualified; and
d) a right to due process when community placement is being considered.
1 REPORT, supra note 44, at 44. Congress couched the patients' rights in this
language: "It is the sense of the Congress that each State should review and revise
... its laws to ensure that mental health patients receive the protection and services
they require .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1982).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1982).
50. See id. § 9502 (repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(1), 95 Stat. 357, 560 (1981)).
51. See 1 REPORT, supra note 44, at 42 ("[i]n adversary or judicial settings
[the Commission] recognize[s] the importance of counsel to represent not only the
mentally disabled ... but also the State or provider against which a claim is
made").
52. See generally 4 TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH (Appendix) 1359, 1366 (1978) ("[t]he President's Com-
mission should support legislation which would establish and adequately finance a
system of comprehensive advocacy services for mentally handicapped persons")
[hereinafter TASK PANEL REPORTS].
53. See Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 4, at 164 ("record of counsel providing
services to the mentally ill has never lived up" to the standard of " 'the ardent
defender of the client's rights and freedoms' ") (quoting Andalman & Chambers,
Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic,
and A Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 46 (1974)).
54. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Dixon v.
Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Hop, 29 Cal.
3d 82, 94, 623 P.2d 282, 289, 171 Cal. Rptr. 721, 728 (1981); In re Fisher, 39
Ohio St. 2d 71, 72, 313 N.E.2d 851, 858 (1974). See generally Perlin, Rights of
the Mentally Handicapped, 4 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 77, 82-83 n. 1
(1976) (discussing right to counsel at involuntary civil commitment proceedings)
[hereinafter Perlin, Mentally Handicapped].
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The advocacy title was short lived; it expired but a few months
after its enactment, as one of the first victims of the Reagan budget
juggernaut. 5 Since this expiration of the advocacy title appeared to
be but one tiny pebble sinking to the bottom of the ocean in the
tidal wave of the (alleged) "New Federalism" emanating from Wash-
ington, few voices were heard in opposition; as a friend mordantly
observed at the time: "It's like complaining that the band on the
Titanic was playing 'Nearer My God to Thee' in the wrong key."
Over the past four years, however, there have been signs (albeit
slim ones) that the tide may be ready to turn: recent hearings before
a Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped have turned up the
same deadingly familiar stories of abuse, mistreatment, and negligence56
that Congress has been hearing for at least fifteen years.5 7 In response
to the testimony adduced at these hearings, Senator Lowell Weicker (R.
Conn.), long a congressional champion of the handicapped, has intro-
duced new legislation (the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Persons Act of 1985),8 which would mandate the provision of legal
advocacy services "to ensure the protection of mentally ill persons"
who are receiving treatment in state facilities. 9 In short, as a local
ex-manager used to note: "It ain't over, 'til it's over," and it still
ain't over.
55. See supra note 50.
56. See 131 CONG. REc. S4508 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Weicker) ("we recognize the illness of these [mentally disabled] patients, yet we
would not allow cancer patients or leukemia victims to suffer such deprivation").
57. The court in Lessard v. Schmidt relied heavily upon hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that were held during the ninety-first
Congress in 1969-70. See 349 F. Supp. at 1087, 1089-90, 1102.
58. S. 974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rc. S4509-11 (1985) [hereinafter
S. 974]. After this speech was given, the bill introduced by Senator Weicker was
signed into law. See Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10801-10851
(1986)).
59. S. 974, supra note 58, § 5(b)(l)(A), 131 CoNG. Ruc. S4510 (1985). The
congressional purposes of the enacted bill are:
(1) to ensure that the rights of mentally ill individuals are protected;
and
(2) to assist States to establish and operate a protection and advocacy
system for mentally ill individuals which will-
(A) protect and advocate the rights of such individuals through activities
to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and Federal and State
statutes; and
(B) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of mentally ill individuals
if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause
to believe that the incidents occurred.
42 U.S.C.A. § 10801(b) (1986).
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C. Influence and Response of Organizations
In addition to considering these legal trends, it is also important
to pay attention to the roles of the other "players in the game"-
organizations representing the mental health professional and those
speaking for ex-patients.
Over the past decade, for example, the increase in the influence
of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) on the development
of mental disability law has been little short of astonishing. From.
its nadir-when it declined the court's invitation to participate in
the post-adjudication order-crafting in Wyatt v. Stickney6°-to its
current status (in which it participates regularly in the most significant
cases dealing with such important doctrines as the right to treatment,
the right to refuse treatment, and the right to aftercare), the APA
has become a major force in shaping the contours of mental health
law at the Supreme Court level. While at first blush, this change
in influence might appear merely to reflect Chief Justice Burger's
long-term fascination with psychiatry, 61 a closer look at the ledger-
60. While it is not absolutely clear why the APA did not participate, the
suggestion raised by Dr. Robert L. Sadoff, past president of the American As-
sociation of Psychiatry and the Law, has never been repudiated:
Psychiatrists trained as physicians have always been concerned that the
courts will usurp their medical functions by telling them how they must
treat their patients. Apparently for this reason, the APA chose not to
consult with Judge Johnson in the Wyatt case ... when he asked for
standards for hospitalized psychiatric patients.
Sadoff, Changes in Mental Health Law: Progress for Patients, Problems for Psy-
chiatrists, in 4 NEW DIRECTION IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: CoPnNo wTrH THE LEGAL
ONSLAUGHT 1, 2 (1979).
According to Dr. Alan Stone, there were three main reasons why the psychiatric
establishment chose to "remain aloof":
First, there was the problem of the APA's defensive response to [Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966)]. Second, Alabama's Com-
missioner of Mental Health, Dr. Stonewall Stickney, had, before the
suit, called on the APA to try to help him improve conditions. The
APA knew what was happening in Alabama's hospitals, but preferred
to try to help Dr. Stickney persuade, rather than to resort to legal action.
Third, the psychiatric establishment had very little structural capacity to
take any action, and certainly not a controversial action like naming a
colleague as defendant.
Stone, The Right to Treatment and the Medical Establishment, 2 BULL. AM. ActA.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 159, 162 (1974).
For a list of those professional organizations which did participate in the Wyatt
standard-setting, see Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 375 n.3 (American Orthopsychiatric
Association, American Psychological Association, American Civil Liberties Union,
and American Association on Mental Deficiency were amici in the case).
61. Chief Justice Burger has written various articles on psychiatry and the law.
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no other Justice joined Burger's concurrence in O'Connor v.
Donaldson62 in 1975; no other joined in his concurrence in Youngberg
v. Romeo63 in 1982; no other joined his concurrence in Ake v.
Oklahoma64 in 1985-makes it more likely that it is rather a reflection
of the good judgment of former APA President Alan Stone in
retaining Joel Klein, former clerk to Judge Bazelon and Justice
Powell and former litigator at the Mental Health Law Project, as
the APA's lead counsel. 6 In an area as discrete, as young, as self-
contained, and-to dredge up my own favorite neologism one more
time-as "fluxy ' ' 66 as mental health law, the retention of one skilled,
expert litigator as counsel to a professional association may have a
dramatic (and lasting) effect on the development of the law.
The APA, of course, is not the only professional association
concerned with mental disability law developments: the American
Psychology Association, the National Association of Social Workers,
and other groups of mental health professionals have all turned to
the courts in recent years on matters of patients' rights67 and profes-
sional "turf" divisions (particularly on questions of eligibility for
third-party insurance payments). 6 This inter-professional competition
shows no sign of abating, 69 and we can reasonably expect future
litigation to reflect the heightened involvement of these and other
alternative psychotherapists in the future.
It is also necessary to point out that several organizations are
See, e.g., Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FED. PROBATION, June,
1964, at 3.
62. 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975).
63. 457 U.S. 307, 329 (1982).
64. 470 U.S. 67, 80 (1985).
65. For an account of Mr. Klein's involvement in the O'Connor case, see
Robitscher, Commitment and the Courts: The Addington Case, 4 J. PSYCIATRIC
TREATMENT & EVALUATION 57, 59 (1982) (citing R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN 369-83 (1979)).
66. See Perlin, Mentally Handicapped, supra note 54, at 77 (using "fluxiness"
to describe changes and advances, particularly within prior three years, in area of
rights of mentally handicapped).
67. See supra note 60.
68. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
69. Cf. Post, And Now the Age of the Barefoot Psychotherapist, N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at 20 (letter to editor) ("[t]he growth of
lay psychotherapy in the United States ...threatens to denude the country of its
only wholly qualified line of defense against mental and emotional illness: the
physician trained both in biological and psychodynamic psychiatry"); Goleman,
Social Workers Vault into a Leading Role in Psychotherapy, N.Y. Times, Apr.
30, 1985, at Cl, col. 3 (describing "revolution" in psychotherapy due to in-




dramatically opposed to the positions invariably taken by organized
psychiatry. These organizations are self-help, ex-patients' groups that
have become increasingly involved in litigation, mostly, but not
exclusively, in opposition to involuntary civil commitment statutes70
and in support of mental patients' rights to refuse the administration
of psychotropic medication .7 These groups-provocatively titled, as
the Alliance for the Liberation Front, the Network Against Psy-
chiatric Assault, and Project Release-reflect more than the national
tide of consumerism launched by the Nader movement of the sev-
enties. They also reflect an important concept more lasting than
most "evolving trends": the notion that ex-patients, like all other
"discrete and insular minorities," isolated from the majoritarian,
democratic political process, will exercise their right to self-deter-
mination and, to the greatest extent possible, control their own
destinies. 72 This development cannot be overlooked.
III. The Attitude of the United States Supreme Court
This survey, is, of course, still incomplete, since I have (inten-
tionally, to be sure) left the most important part for last: the attitude
of the United States Supreme Court towards each of these trends
and towards the whole gestalt of mental health law. For if we look
at the Supreme Court's record over the past decade, we can identify
three basic, relatively discrete phases through which the Court has
passed in its treatment of substantive and procedural constitutional
issues affecting civilly committed mental patients. This trifurcation
consciously excludes cases based on: (1) issues of federal pleading,
procedures, and jurisdiction; (2) interpretation of federal statutes;
and (3) the criminal law/mental health intersection. Although I will
70. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). In this
case, Project Release, a not-for-profit corporation composed of persons who were
or had been in New York State mental hospitals as either voluntary, involuntary,
or emergency patients, brought suit alleging that New York State Mental Hygiene
Law violated appellants' fourteenth amendment substantive and procedural due
process rights.
71. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d Cir. 1981) (Alliance for the
Liberation of Mental Patients served as amicus curiae), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., J. CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNA-
TIVES TO THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM xiii (1978) ("[i]n the mental patients' libera-
tion movement .. . [w]e came together to express our anger and despair at the way
we were treated. Out of that process has grown the conviction that we must set
up our own alternatives, because nothing that currently exists or is proposed fun-
damentally alters the unequal power relationships that are at the heart of the present
mental health system") (emphasis in original).
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speak of these as well (in some cases, they reflect even more elo-
quently the Supreme Court's attitudes towards the underlying issues),
for purposes of pigeonholing, I will limit myself to the constitutional
decisions arising from cases involving the civilly committed. This
division also lets me do what I have always wanted to: set up a
tripartite baseball/opera/rock'n'roll metaphor.
7 1
A. The Supreme Court of 1972-1975
First is what I would characterize, in baseball parlance, as the
"Rookie Phenomenon" stage: a teenage Dwight Gooden shattering
strikeout records; Willie Mays up from Triple A making barehanded
catches while crashing into outfield walls; Mickey Mantle reaching
"Death Valley" in the old Yankee Stadium from both sides of the
plate. The Supreme Court of 1972 to 1975 fits into this framework,
including its first pronouncement in Jackson v. Indiana74 that the
due process clause applies to all aspects of the commitment process,
75
and its later declarations in O'Connor v. Donaldson76 that: (1) mental
patients have a constitutional right to liberty if they are not dangerous
and can "live safely in freedom"; 77 and (2) treatment matters are
cognizable in federal courts under the Constitution.7 1 Jackson and
O'Connor together let mental health advocates know that their pleas
would, for the first time in jurisprudential history, be taken seriously
by the federal courts.
B. The Supreme Court of 1979-1980
Second is what opera fans recognize as the "middle period":
Verdi's Trovatore-Rigoletto-Traviata years, Puccini's Fancuilla-Trit-
tico stage, or Wagner's Meistersinger-Tannhauser time. In short, a
period of some retrenchment producing works neither as provocative
as their predecessors (in the case of Puccini) nor as complete as
their successors (in the cases of Verdi and Wagner), but yet worthy
of significant attention. The Supreme Court reached this middle
period in 1979 and 1980, deciding Addington v. Texas,79 Parham
73. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
74. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
75. Id. at 738 ("due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed").
76. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
77. Id. at 573-76.
78. Id. at 574 n.10 ("[wihere 'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for depriving
a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless
to determine whether the asserted ground is present") (emphasis added).
79. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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v. J.R.,80 and Vitek v. Jones,8 thus shaping the procedural contours
of the involuntary civil commitment process. When read together,
these cases reflected a specific vision on the part of the Court: while
most basic procedural due process protections applied to the com-
mitment hearing, 82 and while more than the simple traditional civil
burden of proof of "preponderance of the evidence" was necessary
for commitment (as a reflection of the "weight and gravity" of the
individual's interest in the outcome of the commitment proceeding),83
it was also clear that the Court was willing (almost eager) under
certai*n circumstances (for example, the commitment of juveniles by
their parents) to give far greater discretion to psychiatric judgments
than one might have thought from its earlier Jackson and O'Connor
opinions.84 The Chief Justice's caustic (and misguided) characteri-
zation of commitment hearings as "time-consuming procedural
minuets" 81 indicated that, for the mental health advocate, the halcyon
days of the early seventies were perhaps over.
C. The Supreme Court of 1982
For the third phase-'.moment" might be more accurate than
"phase," since I am referring to about two weeks in late June of
1982-let's turn to the spectacle of rock'n'roll "oldies" revivals:
singers and groups whose biggest hits are a decade or two behind
them, attempting to "turn back the hands of time" and give an
expectant audience (willing to suspend disbelief) the illusion of status
quo ante. Here, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 6 Mills v. Rogers,87 and
their seeming dopplegangers (Plante v. Scott,8" and Rennie v. Klein"g),
the Court appeared to be breaking new ground on several fronts:
(1) in setting out for the first time in Youngberg some substantive
treatment rights possessed by the institutionally mentally handicapped
to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, safety, freedom
from bodily restraint and such minimally adequate or reasonable
80. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
81. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
82. See id. at 488-92.
83. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
84. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 607-08. The Court stated: "The mode and
procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges. What is
best for a child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment
of physicians in each case." Id.
85. Id. at 605.
86. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
87. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
88. 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
89. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
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training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint; 9° and
(2) by appearing in Mills to be at least comfortable with both the
notion of the constitutional underpinnings of the right to refuse
treatment 9' and the importance of evaluating a drug's potential side
effects in calibrating a constitutional calculus. 92 Nevertheless, there
is more than a bit of a trompe l'oeil effect at play here: in Youngberg,
the defendants had conceded most of the rights93 (no doubt in a
successful effort at loss-cutting), while the Court had previously
recognized the other rights in prison conditions cases, 94 and simply
extended these cases to the "easier" fact setting of mental retardation
facilities. Also, while the right-to-refuse foundation of Mills was
novel, the Court's decision not to reach the merits (but rather to
certify the case back to the First Circuit in light of an intervening
Massachusetts state court case95) tends to give a hollow tone to much
of the opinion's precatory language. Similarly, the Court's decision
merely to vacate and remand Scott96 and Rennie97 in light of Young-
berg seems to reflect a bit of its exhaustion (or at least mild ennui)
with the once novel notion of patients' rights.
D. Response of Lower Courts
Other courts, however, have not been quite so exhausted. In the
three years since Youngberg was decided, other federal courts have
expressed a clear willingness to interpret this case expansively on
the question of adequacy of medical care, 98 propriety of appointing
a special master to oversee court decree monitoring, 99 and the court's
power to order reduction of a specific institutional population. 1°°
90. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-19.
91. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 298-99.
92. See id. at 293 n. 1.
93. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 ("[s]tate concedes that respondent has a
right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care").
94. See id. at 315-16 (citing, inter alia, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)
(right to safe conditions); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1,
18 (1979) (right to freedom from bodily restraint) (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting in part)).
95. See In re Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (person has
protected liberty interest in refusing treatment involving antipsychotic drug).
96. 458 U.S. at 1101.
97. 458 U.S. at 1119.
98. See Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center for Mental Retardation,
556 F. Supp. 677, 678-679 (D. Mass. 1983).
99. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956,
962-65 (2d Cir. 1983).




Most important, in the Second Circuit case of Society for Good
Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo,1 1 the court specifically adopted
the position suggested by Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Young-
berg-that, in addition to the rights articulated in the majority's
opinion, the institutionalized also have a "due process right to
training sufficient to prevent basic self-care skills from deteriorat-
ing, ' 10 2 regardless of whether the residents are characterized as "vol-
untary" or "involuntary."' 0
In the area of right to refuse treatment, lower courts have continued
to follow the dictates of Rennie and Mills,1°4 and at least one circuit' 05
has adhered to that earlier aspect of Rennie that had mandated
a "least restrictive alternative" analysis in dealing with drugging
questions, 106 even after the Supreme Court had declined to apply
that analysis to treatment issues in Youngberg. In short, the heart
of the mental disability law is still beating.
E. Other Supreme Court Decisions
Having said all of this, I want to devote a few minutes to those
categories of Supreme Court cases that I have intentionally (and
arbitrarily) excluded from this overview: statutory cases, criminal
cases, and jurisdictional cases. Briefly, the Court has indicated a
willingness to scrutinize the meaning and the implications of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973107 (arguably the most important
101. 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 1250.
103. Id. Since the date of this speech, courts have split sharply on the question
of the right to community treatment following Youngberg. Compare Clark v. Cohen,
794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.) (applying the right), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3358 (1986)
and Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1992 (1986) with Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737
F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply the right) and Phillips v. Thompson,
715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
104. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 977-81 (2d Cir. 1983)
(involuntarily committed patients have right under New York State law to refuse
medication).
105. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 n.7 (10th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing
case at bar from Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), in which Court
declined to apply "less intrusive means" analysis), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985).
106. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 847 (3d Cir. 1981) ("at least thirty-five
jurisdictions explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the least restrictive doctrine"). This
aspect of the opinion was deleted. following the Supreme Court's remand in light
of Youngberg. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70 (on remand).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This section states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
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statute yet enacted to combat discrimination against the mentally
and physically handicapped), and the Education of the Handicapped
Act, 08 but a reluctance to delve into the nuances of the Develop-
mental Disabilities Act' 9 (after its initial 1981 decision in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst I) 10 that the Act
merely expressed a congressional "preference" for a certain kind of
treatment"' rather than a mandate requiring the states to provide
"'appropriate treatment' in the 'least restrictive environment' ,,).I12
In the area of mental health issues in a criminal law setting, the
Supreme Court's behavior has been, excuse the expression, mad-
dening. Firist, it dealt severe blows to insanity acquittees and defend-
ants facing the death penalty by holding: (1) in Jones v. United
States"3 that, when a criminal defendant establishes that he is not
guilty by reason of insanity, he may be constitutionally confined to
a mental institution on the basis of a burden of proof lesser than
that needed to sustain the commitment of civil patients;" 4 and (2)
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
Id.
The Supreme Court reviewed this statute in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1985) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)) does
not include claims in which state reduced from 20 to 14 the number of annual
inpatient hospital days that state medicaid would cover on behalf of medicaid
recipient).
108. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1400(c) provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all handicapped children
have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their
parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide
for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure
the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
Id. § 1400(c) (1982).
The Court scrutinized this statute in Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468
U.S. 883, 890-91 (1984) (clean intermittent catherization procedure necessary for
handicapped 8-year-old girl to avoid injury to kidneys is "related service" under
the Education of the Handicapped Act; thus school receiving federal funds under
Act must provide service).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See supra note 42 for
the congressional declaration of purpose of this Act.
110. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 18 (quoting Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d
84, 107 (3d Cir. 1979) (lower court proceeding)).
113. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
114. Id. at 366-68.
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in Barefoot v. Estelle15 that it is permissible at a death penalty
hearing for a psychiatrist to testify about a defendant's probable
"future dangerousness" in response to a hypothetical question even
when that psychiatrist never examined the defendant. 1 16 Then the
Court came back in Ake v. Oklahoma1 7 to hold that when a
defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the
time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, he
is constitutionally required to have access to psychiatric assistance
on this issue."'
This change of form in mid-stride is all the more remarkable when
one considers the depth of the split-on the issues of: (1) psychiatric
ability to predict dangerousness; and (2) the degree of deference to be
paid to psychiatric judgments-between the majority opinions and
the dissents in both Jones and Barefoot.119 In less than two year's
time, the Court philosophically reversed itself, and adopted the
position urged by a coalition of mental health advocates and mental
health professionals (most notably the APA)-bedfellows that seem
now to couple on most criminal law issues but on few (if any) civil
matters-that, without an independent defense witness, "the risk of
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.' ' 20 In
short, the only trend to discern here is that the pattern of case
developments appears to defy trend setting.
I have left, though, the most important development for last: the
Court's monumental decision of January, 1984 in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II),121 holding that the
eleventh amendment bars the granting of relief against a state official
115. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
116. Id. at 903-04.
117. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
118. See id. at 76-85. On the question of the relationship between Barefoot and
Ake, see Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant,
Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling
the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 91 (1985).
On the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants in general, see Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled
Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales,
or "Doctrinal Abyss"?, 29 ARiz. L. REV. - (1987) (in print). ,
119. Compare Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896 (majority opinion) ("[tihe suggestion
that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant's
future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel") with id.
at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[t]he Court holds that psychiatric testimony
about a defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that.such
testimony is wrong two times out of three").
120. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
121. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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on the basis of state law. 2 The Court stated that to hold otherwise
would not "vindicate the supreme authority of federal law.' 2 3 The
eleventh amendment bar would be inapplicable only when: (1) a
plaintiff sought monetary damages against a defendant in his in-
dividual capacity; or (2) a defendant acted " 'without any authority
whatever.' ,1"'2 The bitterly split five-four decision prompted a
searing dissent by Justice Stevens, who characterized the majority
as having reached a "perverse result' '1 25 via a "voyage into the sea
of undisciplined lawmaking." 126
While the commentators have just begun to come to grips with
the enormity of this decision, 27 it is clear that the Pennhurst case
will have an incalculable effect on the future of mental health
advocacy far beyond the specific legal issue at its heart: whether
patients at that facility have a right to be deinstitutionalized in the
least restrictive alternative environment (an issue, ironically, upon
which the case was ultimately settled for almost the precise terms
sought by plaintiffs when the case was filed during the early days
of Gerald Ford's Presidency). 28
As a result of Pennhurst, mental health advocates (and other
lawyers representing institutionalized and incapacitated individuals)
will turn their attention more and more to state court as a preferred
forum. 2 9 In doing so, they will replicate the strategy choices of
other public interest lawyers representing clients in zoning, health
care, discrimination, and similar matters, who, for the last decade,
have been regularly beating a path to the state courthouse door,
122. See id. at 97-124.
123. Id. at 106.
124. Id. at 101 n.11 (quoting Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J.)).
125. Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court's "new pronouncement will require
the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability
of state-law grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles of judicial
restraint")..,
126.id. at 166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pen-
nhurst Case, 98 HAv. L. REv. 61 (1984) (assessing impact of recent Supreme
Court decisions on eleventh amendment).
128. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221
(E.D. Pa. 1985). See supra note 103 for a discussion of the split in circuits in apply-
ing the right to treatment to community settings.
129. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978) (addressing
question of entitlement to automatic periodical judicial review of validity of restraints
placed upon persons found not guilty by reason of insanity and subsequently
committed); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975) (establishing minimal
constitutional requirements that must be met before defendant acquitted on grounds
of insanity may be committed).
[Vol. XV
19871 MENTAL HEALTH TRENDS
seeking relief in a wide variety of public law areas, recognizing that
state constitutions may provide a higher level of protection of per-
sonal rights than those guaranteed by the federal counterpart. 130
This phenomenon is, of course, no secret. Interestingly, it received
its biggest philosophical and tactical boost about eight years ago
from United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan. In an
often-cited article in the Harvard Law Review,' Brennan laid down
the gauntlet: "The legal revolution which has brought federal law
to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed.' ' 132
While, at first, mental disability advocates did not appear to pay
too much attention to Justice Brennan, more recent events, such as
the Pennhurst opinion, have caused them to sit up and take notice.
Some courts-notably New Jersey's 33 and New York's'34-have re-
sponded nobly and have shown a willingness to interpret both state
statutes and state constitutions in ways that make it clear that the
''equal access to justice' 3 sought by the handicapped can, indeed,
130. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 668-69 (1982) (Oregon Court
of Appeals "took an overly expansive view of the application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause following a mistrial resulting from the defendant's own motion");
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) ("neither appellants'
federally recognized property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been
infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees
to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants' property").
On the specific applicability of state constitutional provisions to the rights of the
mentally disabled, see Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights
for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LoYoLA L.A.L. REV 1249 (1987).
131. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
132. Id. at 491.
133. See, e.g., In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 139-40, 462 A.2d 1252, 1258 (1983)
(although patients in mental hospitals were no longer committable, they were
incalpable of survival on their own; thus state may continue confinement "on a
provisional or conditional basis to protect their essential well-being, pending efforts
to foster the placement of these individuals in proper supportive settings outside
the institution").
134. See, e.g., Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 531-34, 463 N.E.2d 588,
591-92, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250-51 (1984) (question of whether discharged patients
"are entitled to appropriate residential placement, supervision, and care, including
follow-ups to verify that their placement remains appropriate" is justiciable con-
troversy, contrary to lower courts' rulings that controversy was not justiciable
"because it would require the court to oversee a long series of continuous acts
... [and] the relevant statutory duty involves the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion").
135. S. HERR, ADVOCACY UNDER THE DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABIInEs AcT 88 (1976)
(quoted in 4 TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 52, at 1366 n.1).
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become a reality in the state court arena. The recent decisions of
New Jersey's and New York's highest courts on behalf of the
"discharged pending placement"-patients who no longer meet the
criteria for commitment but who have "nowhere else to go' ' 36-
bear eloquent testimony to this new reality. It is inevitable that other
courts will follow.
IV. Conclu'sion
At least five separate (but somewhat overlapping) trends appear
to be present.
First, the Supreme Court is excruciatingly ambivalent about mental
disability law issues: on the one hand, it discusses the imprecision
of psychiatric diagnosis;'37 on the other, it allows the admission into
evidence of the most wildly speculative testimony as to predictions
of future dangerousness.13 1 On one hand, it acknowledges the brutal
conditions still prevalent in so many public mental institutions;'39
on the other, it raises procedural roadblocks so as to curtail the
use of the federal court forum as an arena in which institutionalized
citizens can vindicate their constitutional rights.' 40 And while on one
hand it characterizes due process hearings as "time-consuming pro-
cedural minuets,"14 1 on the other, it continues to adhere to the
notion that procedural due process applies to all matters touching
on the entire commitment process. 142
Beyond these ambivalences, the Court remains fascinated with the
whole notion of mental disability law: like the moth drawn to the
flame, it continues to grant certiorari so as to grapple with yet-
136. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
137. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("[g]iven the lack of
certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as
to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual
is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous").
138. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903-04 (1983). See supra notes 115-
16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's holding.
139. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981)
("[district court's] findings of facts are undisputed: Conditions at Pennhurst are not
only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff
members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded").
140. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's holding.
141. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979).
142. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (" 'commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection' ") (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
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unanswered questions. It has already decided the Ake case on the
question of a defendant's right to an independent expert to proffer
an insanity defense;' 41 within the next month, it is expected to decide
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that "zones out" group
homes for the mentally disabled'" and the implications of the eleventh
amendment-the heart of its most recent Pennhurst II decision-
for law suits filed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'4 5
In short, we can expect even more ambiguity in the future.
Writing last year in The American Journal of Psychiatry, Paul
Appelbaum charged that these ambivalences reflected nothing more
than "factual inconsistency in the service of a transcendent ideological
goal, '" 46 the "limit[ation on] judicial involvement in institutional
affairs."'1 47 While Appelbaum may well be right, my sense is that
the Court's ambivalence is deeper, and is at least partially caused
by the Justices' ambivalent (but familiar) feelings of awe, fear, and
revulsion towards the mentally handicapped, towards the facilities
143. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
144. See Cleburne Living Centers v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
After this speech was given, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit'sjudgment insofar as it held that a special use permit for the constuction of a group
home for the mentally retarded was invalid. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Centers, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258-60 (1985). While recognizing that the "mentally
retarded as a group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune,"
id. at 3259, the Court also noted that "this difference is largely irrelevant unless
the [group] home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests
of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses and hospitals
would not." Id. The Court found that the group home would not threaten the
city's legitimate interests. See id.
145. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 469 U.S. 1095 (1984).
After the date of this speech, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that a state implicitly consents to be sued when it receives funds under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147-50 (1985).
In reversing, the Court stated that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitu-
tionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental nature of the
interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion." Id. at 3147.
The Court concluded that there was not "unequivocal statutory language sufficient
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 3149.
This decision has been legislatively "overruled" by the Rehabilitation Act Amend-
ments of 1986, P.L. 99-506, § 1003(a)(l), 100 Stat. 4532, 4570 ("[a] State shall
not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973").
146. Appelbaum, The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
827, 831 (1984).
147. Id. at 834.
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in which the institutionalized mentally handicapped live, and espe-
cially towards the mentally ill who commit what would otherwise
be "criminal acts." Whether or not C.G. Schoenfeld is correct when
he suggests that "one of the main unconscious reasons for punishing
criminals-assuaging the guilt of law-abiding persons-does not come
into play [in the way we treat the criminally insane],"141 it seems
to me that the Justices of the Supreme Court have just as difficult
a time rationalizing their unconscious feelings as do the rest of
US.
Second, in response to all of this, the federal district courts and
circuit courts appear generally reluctant to "roll over and play dead."
In the areas of both the right to treatment and the right to refuse
treatment, at least some circuits have shown a willingness to go beyond
the more narrow limits of Youngberg and Mills by building a defini-
tion of minimally acceptable treatment,1 49 by selectively applying right
to treatment concepts to community settings,' and by resuscitating
the notion of the "least restrictive alternative" in treatment refusal
decisions. I1
Third, because of jurisdictional decisions such as Pennhurst, mental
health advocates will be turning to state courts with greater frequency,
especially in areas such as the right to community aftercare, in which
the Supreme Court has appeared to be particularly unsympathetic.
This new interest in state courts appears to me to be a major growth
area for all aspects of public interest law'52 in the future, and I
think mental disability cases will be riding the crest of the wave.
Fourth, both state legislatures and Congress have firmly placed
the whole spectrum of legal issues affecting the mentally disabled
on their debating agendas over the past decade. Thus, we can
reasonably expect newer and more comprehensive regulatory statutes
to emerge over the coming years (although, most likely, without
much in the way of supplemental funds).
148. C.G. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE LAW 32 (1984).
149. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239
(2d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the court's holding.
150. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
151. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985); supra note 105 and accompanying text.
152. Cf. State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 396-97, 489 A.2d 1175, 1179
(App. Div. 1985) ("[w]hile the United States Constitution remains the primary
source of fundamental rights, it is now well established that we may look to our
State Constitution to provide a higher level of protection of personal rights than




Finally, the past decade has made it clear that there are more
"players in the game" besides the attorneys involved. Professional
associations, including, but not limited to, the American Psychiatric
Association, and ex-patient groups, have made it clear that they
have an important stake in the outcome of the various court cases,
and that they do not plan to sit passively by while the lawyers argue
over abstract notions of due process.
While this survey has been, alas, cursory, I think it underscores
the one point I want to make: the notion of mental disability law
as an important and discrete legal specialty is an idea that is being
taken seriously by the United States Supreme Court, by the federal
and state courts, by legislatures, and by all participants in the mental
health process. It is an area marked by considerable and rapid
change and peppered with internal ambivalences. The showman Billy
Rose used to say: "Say what you want about me, but be sure you
spell my name right." I do not think there is any question that
over the last decade, we have all learned how to spell.
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